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WILL THE REAL ALFONZO LOPEZ
PLEASE STAND UP: A REPLY TO
PROFESSOR NAGEL
Melvyn R. Durchslag"
Professor Nagel concludes that United States v. Lopez' will

have little impact on the constitutional distribution of authority
between the federal government and the states. While the belief
that "we may be on the verge of important alterations in the federal system ...

is entirely understandable," 2 coming as it does dur-

ing a term when not one but three important federalism cases were
decided, Nagel argues that Lopez is little more than "an aspect of
normal, predictable doctrinal gyrations."3 His reasons are clearly
stated and certainly provocative. The Lopez Court, he states, is
engaged in an adjudicative technique he denominates "successive
validation," a technique that subordinates one of two mutually
exclusive principles in a particularcase, but holding the possibility
that the subordinated principle in another case could become dominant.4 In declaring 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) unconstitutional, the Court
was simply "redeem[ing] its pile of pledges,"5 waiting for the day
when it could hold, rather than simply repeat, that Congress's
commerce powers are indeed limited, and that in order to assert
them the matter regulated must be "substantially related" to interstate commerce. Consequently, Lopez was not so much a groundbreaker as it was a "quasi-random event." 6
Nagel admits that he could be wrong if a majority of the
Court heartfeltly believed in a decentralized political system, but he

* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
1.
2.
(1996)
3.
4.
5.
6.

115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CAsE W. RES. L. REa.
[hereinafter The Future of Federalism].
Id. at 648.
Id. at 650-52.
Id. at 654.
Id. at 655.
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finds the evidence of that mixed at best.7 Moreover (and here he
is more tentative), while Lopez could be seen as part of a wider
political movement toward greater decentralization, Nagel sees no
consistency in that movement either, being animated as it is by a
strange grouping of true believers, issue-specific partisans who are
very selective about when they advocate decentralization and those
who oppose all government at whatever level, but find the federal
government the easiest target at the moment.8 In any event, opines
Nagel, "[a]gainst this backdrop of complex, imponderable political
and cultural forces, the Lopez decision-and indeed, the Justices
themselves-recede into relative insignificance." 9
On a number of scores I agree with Professor Nagel. I believe, as does he, that when all is said and done the Court is repackaging a test that it has recited in virtually every Commerce
Clause case decided since 1937. However, as I will argue below,
the evidence of that is far more opaque and its significance far
greater than Professor Nagel suggests. I also agree that the Court's
federalism-labeled crystal ball is quite clouded and will most likely
be this way for the near future. On the other hand, my sense is
that Chief Justice Rehnquist has bigger fish to fry than 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(q). I think (with no way of verifying my beliefs) that Lopez
was written the way it was (not applying its own test of validity)
in order to lay the foundation for a time when the Court has the
numbers to mount a stronger attack on political centralization.'"
Finally, I agree that the Court is not the institution that will lead
the next social or political revolution; it has never been in the
vanguard of social change. Indeed, as Nagel states, "sooner or later
the Supreme Court goes along with the dominant trends of the
time."" Consequently, in the cosmic sense that Professor Nagel

7. Id. at 658. On March 27, however, the Court struck one more blow against centralization by holding that Congress has no power under the Commerce Clause to waive a
state's Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity even with respect to Indian Tribes, an
area over which the Congress may exercise exclusive legislative authority. Seminole Tribe
of Florida v. Florida, 64 U.S.L.W. 41 (1996). Seminole Tribe does not of course limit
Congress's power to regulate Indian tribes; it only limits its ability to permit individuals
to sue states in federal courts. Its scope is thus limited to private rights of action in
federal court. But the Court's language is unmistakenly focused on increasing the states'
independence from the federal government.
8. Future of Federalism, supra note 2, at 658-59.
9. Id. at 661.
10. See Sara Sun Beale, Speech at the Case Western Reserve Law Review Symposium:
The New Federalism after United States v. Lopez (Nov. 11, 1996).
11. Future of Federalism, supra note 2, at 659. There are numerous examples of in-
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speaks, Lopez and its deciding Justices (indeed all Justices qua
Justices) are now and probably always have been "relatively insignificant" except (and this is a big exception) as an institution that
can lend moral and legal sanction to a political movement.' 2 The
Court can, in other words, move partisan political rhetoric to a
higher ground.'3
I have little faith in my distinctive abilities as a political or
social commentator, therefore my remarks will be limited to the
first point, the Court is simply re-packaging its time honored "substantial effects" doctrine--engaging in "successive validation" (as
Nagel puts it) and the significance that this has. First, while I
believe that the Lopez Court has not pronounced a new substantive
doctrine, I am not quite as certain of this point as is Professor
Nagel. I believe that some argument can be made that the Court is,
to use Nagel's words, engaged in the adjudicative devises of "denial,"' 4 "legalistic devaluation,"' 5 or even "substitution."' 6 And
second, the impact of "successive validation" is potentially far
more significant than Nagel asserts. I will discuss each of these
two points in order.
I.

Notwithstanding Justice O'Connor's contrary statement in New
York v. United States, 17 it matters whether Lopez holds (1) that

despite an activity's relationship to commerce, the Tenth Amendment prevents Congress from regulating it if the activity is "too
local," or (2) that the record demonstrates an insufficient relation-

stances in which the Court appeared to buck political trends and put its own stamp on
the polity: Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298
U.S. 238 (1936); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and as it would seem in hindsight
from this past term, Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995). Most infamous, of
course, was the misbegotten attempt by the Supreme Court in Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S.
(19 How.) 393 (1857), to placate the South and thus attempt to avoid a civil war.
12. Future of Federalism, supra note 2, at 650-51.
13. Cf. James M. O'Fallon, Marbuy, 44 STAN. L. REV. 219, 260 (1992) (arguing that
Marbury v. Madison legitimized the ideology of "nationalist politicians").
14. The Future of Federalism, supra note 2, at 652.
15. Id. at 651.
16. Id. at 653.
17. 505 U.S. 144, 155-56 (1992) (stating that the issue of whether a congressional
action is authorized by Article I of the Constitution and the issue of whether a congressional action unconstitutionally crosses the line into those powers reserved to the States
by the Tenth Amendment are "mirror images" of one another-much like the question
whether the glass is half full or half empty).
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ship between the subject matter of the regulation (such as the
possession of a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school as is the case
in Lopez) and interstate commerce. The first is an attempt to determine the perimeters of federal power. The second only determines
how well the federal government supported its assertion of authority. In the second instance, Congress has the ability to cure an apparent break in the chain from the claimed source of power to its
exercise. It cannot, in the first instance, overcome the more normative judgment that its regulation of a particular transaction was
improper because the issue should be governed by a different level
of government.
My best guess, like that of Professor Nagel, is that Lopez has
more to do with the second statement than the first. It is, in other
words, a source of powers rather than a limitation on powers case.
Unlike National League of Cities v Usery"8 and New York v. United States,9 neither the majority nor Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion speaks about the Tenth Amendment in any substantive
way. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion is mostly devoted to reestablishing that the "proper test requires an analysis of whether
the regulated activity 'substantially effects' interstate commerce."
What distinguished Lopez from cases such as Perez v. United
States2 or Champion v. Ames22 was that the activity being regulated was neither itself commerce nor was its relationship to commerce "visible to the naked eye."'
If the Court had simply stopped with those observations, Professor Nagel's judgment that the Court was simply engaging in a
strategy of successive validation would be more certain. However,
it did not. Both the majority and Justice Kennedy muddied the
waters by talking about "areas ... where States historically have
' and "areas
been sovereign"24
of traditional state concern."' Similar language appeared most prominently in National League of

18. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
19. 505 U.S. 144.
20. 115 S. Ct. at 1630 (emphasis added).
21. 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (holding that Congress has the power to regulate loan
sharking activities).
22. 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (upholding the constitutionality of congressional regulation of
lottery ticket trafficking).
23. 115 S. Ct. at 1632; see also id. at 1640, 1642 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating
that there was a lack of an "evident commercial nexus").
24. Id. at 1632 (Rehnquist, CJ.).
25. Id. at 1638 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Cities to describe a Tenth Amendment limit on the use of
Congress's power to regulate the states' abilities to conduct their
own internal business.' The phrase later found its way into the
analysis in Gregory v. Ashcroft," in which the Court considered
whether Congress, contrary to Missouri's constitutional policy regarding mandatory retirement, intended to apply the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to state judges.28 National League of
Cities and Ashcroft both involved attempted assertions of federal
authority over the employment terms and working conditions of
state employees in ways that Professor Nagel has argued might
shift the allegiance of state employees from the state to the federal
government, thus violating one of the underlying protections of a
divided government. 9 The statute in Lopez, however, regulated
purely private activity, a difference that the Court in New York v.
United States said was significant, indeed determinative." Moreover, it did so in a way that state authority and the policy judgments underlying that authority were not displaced, except in the
most abstract of ways.' Does the Court now mean to conflate
New York v. United States with regulation of private conduct in a
way which would overrule Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Association32 where the application of a "traditional
state functions" standard for evaluating federal regulation of private
conduct was rejected?33 If so, a significant redistribution of constitutional authority has occurred.
In addition to using the language of traditional state functions,
there is other evidence that the Court may be either talking generally about a Tenth Amendment, affirmative limitation on congressional authority or attempting to define a category of activities that
do not fit within Congress's commerce powers. The Lopez majority

26. 426 U.S. at 851-52 (using language such as "impermissibly interfere with the
[States'] integral governmental functions" and "displac[e] the States' freedom").
27. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
28. Id. at 456-57.
29. Robert F. Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League of Cities in
Perspective, 1981 Sup. Cr. REV. 81, 106-07 (1982) [hereinafter Federalism as a Fundamental Value].
30. 505 U.S. at 160 (stating that "this is not a case in which Congress has subjected a
State to the same legislation applicable to private parties").
31. Alfonzo Lopez was initially charged under Texas law for the felony of possessing
a firearm in a school. The state then voluntarily dismissed the state charges on the next
day when Lopez was charged with the federal offense. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
32. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
33. Id. at 292-93.
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apparently places congressional commerce power into three distinct
categories.34 The first two categories are obvious and unexceptional examples of appropriate congressional commerce regulations.'
But it is the third classification that is troublesome because it is far
more narrow than what the Court has previously held to be within
Congress's authority. This category begins inauspiciously enough:
"Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate
those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce,
' 36
i.e., those activities that substantially effect interstate commerce.
But the statement does not end there: "Where economic activity
substantially effects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that
activity will be sustained. '37 Is "non-commercial" activity now
beyond Congress's power to regulate, even if it can be demonstrated that it has a substantial effect on interstate commerce? Despite
Professor Nagel's correct observation that such a standard would be
difficult to administer and would produce indefensible results and
thus could not possibly form the core of future Commerce Clause
decisions,38 I am not so sanguine. Evidently, these objections
would not sway Justice Thomas.39 And Justice Rehnquist's pithy,
formalist dissent in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authoriy 4° and his statement in Hodel that some activities may be
too "local" to be considered "in commerce"'" might indicate that
he too would not object to a categorical, subject matter limit on
Congress's commerce powers.42 Whether a commercial/non-commercial or local/national distinction can hold on any longer or with
any greater success than the direct/indirect test of yesteryear, or
whether it will join the Court's many "discarded doctrine[s]"'43 is
34. See 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30.
35. Id. at 1629 (labeling the first category as "use of the channels of interstate commerce," and the second category as regulating threats to interstate commerce from intrastate activities).
36. Id. at 1629-30 (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 1630 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1640, 1642 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(stating that a nexus is needed between the activity being regulated and interstate commerce for Congress to have the power to regulate at all).
38. The Future of Federalism, supra note 2, at 646-48. But see Deborah Jones Merritt,
Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 694-95 (1995).
39. 115 S. CL at 1642-51 (Thomas, J., concurring).
40. 469 U.S. 528, 579-80 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
41. 452 U.S. at 310 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
42. At least one commentator has read Lopez to limit Congress's commerce authority
to commercial activities. Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
1787, 1789, 1816-18 (1995).
43. The Future of Federalism, supra note 2, at 654.
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not important. What is important is that some Justices are willing
to give it a valiant try and some lower federal courts have already
started."
The counter evidence is Justice Kennedy's concurrence, which

seems to apply a brake on reading Lopez as an affirmative limitation on the exercise of federal power. Unfortunately, that opinion
can also be read in a far less limiting way. Kennedy uses the same
federalism rationales for limiting federal regulatory assertions
against private individuals that Justice O'Connor used in New York
v. United States to limit federal regulatory assertions against the
"states qua states."'45 As well he should. Both the tyranny and the
experimentation rationales are at least as, if not more, congenial to
federal regulation of private conduct than they are to federal regulation of public conduct. Indeed, his somewhat off-handed remark
that "[t]his is not a case where the etiquette of federalism has been
violated by a formal command from the National Government,"'

44. See, e.g., United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 527-28 (9th Cir. 1995)
(deciding that federal prohibition of arson against property used in commerce or in an
activity affecting commerce could not be applied to a private residence in part because a
"house has a particularly local rather than interstate character"); United States v. Mussari,
894 F. Supp. 1360, 1364, 1367 (D. Ariz. 1995) (finding the Child Recovery Support Act
unconstitutional inter alia because criminal law and child custody are areas of traditional
state concern); United States v. Bailey, Crim. No. SA-95-CR-138, 1995 WL 563284
(W.D. Tex., Sept. 7, 1995) (same); United States v. Parker, 64 U.S.L.W. 2313 (E.D. Pa.,
Oct. 30, 1995) (same but decision based on Act not being regulation of commercial activity). For a republican argument that states ought to be free of federal control in areas of
family law, see Dailey, supra note 42, at 1860. Professor Dailey candidly admits she
advocates a return to dual federalism, albeit for reasons unlike those of other commentators who have urged the same thing. See, e.g., James F. Blumstein, Federalism and Civil
Rights: Complementary and Competing Paradigms,47 VAND. L. REV. 1251 (1994) (arguing that the Tenth Amendment should protect specific areas of state concern from federal
control); Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV.
1387 (1987) (stating that Congress's power should be limited in a way which protects
autonomous spheres of state legislative authority). Dual Federalism is certainly the road
Justice Thomas walks in Lopez. See 115 S. Ct. at 1642-51 (Thomas, J., concurring).
In a subsequent conversation about the Symposium with my colleague Ron Coffey, I
was reminded that a resurrection of dual federalism would not only alter the doctrinal
approach to Congress's commerce powers, but also the Court's approach to state powers
under the so-called dormant side of that clause. It is hard to imagine the Court holding,
on the one hand, that a particular activity falls outside Congress's power but that state
regulation of that activity imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce. Indeed, Professor Epstein has argued, on the other side, that Congress's powers to regulate commerce
ought to be limited to matters the dormant Commerce Clause insulates from state regulation. Epstein, supra, at 1454.
45. 115 S. Ct. at 1638-39 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing New York v. United States,
505 U.S. at 181).
46. Id. at 1642 (emphasis added).
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can be read to elevate the infringement of state prerogatives in
Lopez to a higher plane than that in New York v. United States.
II.
Despite the arguments that Lopez marks off distinct boundaries
separating state from federal control, on balance I agree with Professor Nagel that the case does not go that far. While it is true
that Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, who hold the balance of
power in Lopez, speak about traditional state concerns, they also
disavow the use of "content-based boundaries ... to define the
limits of the Commerce Clause."'47 It would appear, then, that Justices Kennedy and O'Connor are less troubled by federal invasion
of some subject-defined state turf than they are by the apparent
lack of any distinct federal interest in regulating the possession of
guns around local schools. If I am correct, congressional findings
that establish a link between the activity regulated and Congress's
distinct commerce-related interest in the national economy may be
more persuasive to Justices Kennedy and O'Connor than to Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, regardless of
how one characterizes the economic nature of the regulated activity.
This, however, tells us little about the impact of Lopez except
that it is less than what it could be. Nor does it necessarily lead to
Professor Nagel's conclusions regarding either the Court's adjudicative technique or that Lopez does not effect, or potentially effect, a
redistribution of decisionmaking authority between the states and
the federal government. It is equally plausible that the Court is
engaging in (again using Nagel's terminology) a covert form of
substitution. While articulating the time-honored (if rarely enforced)
principle of "substantial effect," the Court is, in reality, substituting
the following "rule" (principle may be a stretch):
Where the federal government uses its commerce power to
regulate an activity we "ordinarily" think ought to be a
matter of state prerogative, and there exists no evident federal interest except that which otherwise animates the
state's concern, the federal regulation is presumptively
unconstitutional.

47. Id. at 1637 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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This rule, of course, is not a rule of decision. It does not
determine the eventual outcome of a specific case. It is different,
therefore, than the outcome-determinative nature of the traditional
state functions test of National League of Cities. Instead, the rule
determines the scope of judicial review. It tells us how the Court
is likely to react to the stimuli of particular cases. Consequently,
despite its obvious deficiencies, it is an easier rule to live with
than the rule of decision in National League of Cities. Because it
is essentially a process rule, people with differing views on the
merits of decentralized decisionmaking might agree that Congress
should demonstrate in some way that it is not merely "strong-arming" the Commerce Clause (which I have no doubt Congress was
doing when it enacted § 922(q)).' Unfortunately, because it is a
process rule, it raises serious questions of judicially manageable
standards.49
The analytical key, both to the rule and to the judicial review
problems posed by the rule, is the strength of the presumption of
invalidity. One could argue that there is no presumption, but that
ignores the one obvious point of the majority opinion-the rational
basis test of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses will not
suffice to sustain federal regulation that is, a priori, disconnected
from Congress's interstate commercial authority. Were this not true,
Justice Breyer's dissent would have been the majority opinion."0
Thus, some "plausible" connection between the activity regulated
and commerce will no longer suffice. Whatever might be said
about the pliability of the "substantial relation to commerce" test,
the Court seems adamant that it will not speculate about the existence of such a substantial connection.5' When a case falls within
the "rule", Congress must supply the missing link.

48. The legislative history of § 922(q) is painstakingly chronicled in the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals decision. See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1359-60 (5th Cir.
1993).
49. Justice Souter's dissent demonstrates particular sensitivity to the problems of judicially manageable standards. See 115 S. Ct. at 1651-57 (Souter, J., dissenting). The most
significant scholarly discussion of this problem is JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE NATIONAL PoLrIcAL PROCESS (1980). But see Federalism as a Fundamental
Value, supra note 29, at 89-97 (disputing Choper's distinction between the judicial role in
federalism cases and that in individual liberties cases).
50. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1657-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (analyzing judicial levels
of scrutiny for various congressional exercises of power in arguing for deference to
Congress's finding of a connection between guns near schools and interstate commerce).
51. Id. at 1634 (Rehnquist, CJ.).
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It is possible that Lopez only requires a technical compliance
by Congress. All that is required is facts somewhere in the "record" that reasonably support a substantial nexus and a "clear
statement" of Congress's intent to push the commerce envelope to
its limits. That certainly would have satisfied the Fifth Circuit.52 It
would also satisfy the Gregory v. Ashford concern that Congress
consciously weigh the disruptive effect of its legislation on the
federal system against the necessity of regulation53 If the Lopez
Court's concerns could be satisfied by a "clear statement" from
Congress, it is an unexceptional ruling 4 and Professor Nagel's
conclusion that Lopez will have little impact on the constitutional
division of legislative authority is correct.55 This is not to say that
Lopez is insignificant. It will remain as a symbol of Congress's
limited power and, as Professor Nagel has previously argued, that
symbolism is a powerful source of the states' legitimacy. 6
Reading Lopez to require only some finding by Congress,
while not implausible, is, however, unlikely. Not surprisingly, the
Lopez opinion reads like (then) Justice Rehnquist's concurring
opinion in HodeP7 in which he stated that "simply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially effects
commerce does not necessarily make it so. Congress's findings
must be supported by a rational basis and are reviewable by the
courts." ' Indeed, he went further, putting the burden on Congress
to "show that the activity it seeks to regulate has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce."59 If Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Lopez is to be read to track his opinion in Hodel then the
impact of Lopez is arguably far more significant, not because of
the results it will necessarily produce, but because the Court will
play a far greater role in determining the federal balance. The
Court would determine whether the evidence marshaled by Con-

52. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1365-66.
53. 501 U.S. at 461 (1991) (quoting Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S.
58, 65 (1989)).
54. The standard of judicial review would then likely be close to the "rational basis
with bite" review proposed by Professor Gerald Gunther for the Equal Protection Clause.
See Gerald Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 20-24 (1972); Merritt, supra
note 38, at 684.
55. Future of Federalism, supra note 2, at 659-60.
56. Federalism as a Fundamental Value, supra note 29, at 101-02.
57. 452 U.S. at 307-13 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 311 (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 313.
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gress is probative of a "substantial" nexus between the activity
regulated and the national economic market. Because substantiality
is a qualitative, and not a quantitative question, Professor Nagel's
conclusion becomes somewhat problematic.
Most lower courts interpreting Lopez have been reluctant to
second guess Congress's explicit determinations of an interstate
connection.' But there is no doubt that the leeway given the judiciary is far greater after Lopez than it was before. Moreover, the
question is arguably different after Lopez. Rather than asking
whether there is any logically defensible federal interest, the substantial effects question, seriously posed, queries whether there is a
sufficient federal interest. Thus, we need not necessarily accept
Professor Choper's broad argument that there is no principled way
of answering any federalism question ' in order to understand the
judicial review problem posed by Lopez. As Professor Nagel demonstrates,' the question of when centralized authority has gone
"too far," cannot be answered, one way or the other, by reference
to the Constitution. The best one can do is what Professor Nagel
has done-illustrate the two horns of the adjudicative dilemma and
pick a result, holding out the possibility that another case may be
decided differently. Finally, it does no good to argue that the substantial effects question is one of fact since there is no standard by
which a court can assess the sufficiency of any factual assertion
other than according to a partisan view of the relative regulatory
roles of the federal and state governments. This leaves the federal
judiciary with enormous authority to impose their own views on
the federal/state balance. Such potential should concern liberals and
conservatives alike: liberals because of the (current) expected outcome and conservatives because of the increased authority assumed
by the federal courts.

60. See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569 (3d Cir., 1995) (upholding a federal carjacking statute); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517 (l1th Cir. 1995) (upholding Freedom
of Access to Clinic Entrances Act under Commerce Clause). When Congress has included
a jurisdictional element in the statute, the case is that much easier because the government must then prove, beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case, that the prohibited
act had a substantial interstate nexus. See, e.g., United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553 (7th
Cir. 1995) (dealing with the Hobbs Act). The jurisdictional element, while satisfying the
Lopez Court's concern for substantial effect, does not necessarily help in concluding that
the prohibited activity possesses the requisite commercial characteristics. See supra notes
31-38 and accompanying text.
61. CHOPER, supra note 49, at 201-03.
62. The Future of Federalism, supra note 2, at 649.
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Of those in the majority, only Justice Thomas seeks a theory
that might limit federal power while at the same time avoiding the
pitfalls of judging the qualitative link between interstate commerce
and the activity regulated.63 Unfortunately, as Justice Kennedy
points out' and Professor Nagel confirms, Justice Thomas's particular solution-limiting federal regulation to the movement of
goods across state lines-did not work in the past nor will it work
any better now.
What did the Court say about the problem of judicially manageable standards? Nothing actually. It simply recited the
hegemonous watchword of our judicial faith, "it [is] the judiciary's
duty 'to say what the law is. "'6' Another principle, however, may
have been more appropriately cited. To paraphrase Justice White,
the Court undoubtedly has the "raw judicial power" to review
whether there exists a sufficiently substantial relationship between
an activity and our national economic welfare to justify federal

63. This is not to suggest that I subscribe to Justices Thomas's analysis; I do not. Nor
do I subscribe generally to the notion that "framer's intent" is some objective fact that
can be discovered by turning to the correct page of the book, thus cabining judicial "law
making". But even if I did, it is certainly not clear that Justice Thomas's view of what
the framers intended is accurate. It is certainly at odds with Chief Justice John Marshall's
understanding of the time. Among other things, Justice Thomas simply writes off the
Necessary and Proper Clause with the observation that the Clause would render "many of
Congress' other enumerated powers . . . wholly superfluous." 115 S. Ct. at 1644 (Thomas, J., concurring). How he decides that it is more appropriate to render the Necessary
and Proper Clause superfluous than, for example, the bankruptcy power is not explained.
More than likely it is because of Justice Thomas's personal beliefs about the appropriate
distribution of authority between the federal and the state governments. But see generally
Epstein, supra note 44, (arguing for a limitation on congressional power to protect state
law-making authority).
64. 115 S. Ct. at 1637 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 1633 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
177 (1803). The pejorative comment regarding the citation of Marbury to justify judicial
intervention comes from Gerald Gunther, Judicial Hegemony and Legislative Autonomy:
The Nixon Case and the Impeachment Process, 22 UCLA L. REV. 30, 33 (1974).
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, while clearly more troubled by judicial intervention
in "the ordinary" commerce clause case than are the other three Justices who constitute
the majority, are equally short on discussing the problems of judicially manageable standards. About all the concurrence can muster is the conclusion (hardly an argument) that
"the federal balance is too essential a part of our constitutional structure and plays too
vital a role in securing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene when one or the
other level of Government has tipped the scales too far." 115 S. Ct. at 1639 (Kennedy,
J., concurring). Maybe this proves Professor Nagel's conclusion that our preferences for
judicial review are too strong to sustain judicial abstinence. The Future of Federalism,
supra note 2, at 653.
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regulation. But the wisdom of undertaking that review is quite
something else.'

66. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 222 (White, J., dissenting). For the record, I believe
that Justice White was incorrect when he applied that principle in Roe for many of the
same reasons articulated by Professor Choper as distinguishing the Court's role in federalism cases from its role in individual rights cases. See CHOPER, supra note 49, at 195-205.

